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Sunday, 26 January 2020

Comics Explained: Morbius, the Living Vampire


Recently, the movie trailer for Morbius has been released, so we'll be seeing the live-action debut of Morbius the Living Vampire. One of Spider-Man's foes, and an anti-hero as well, he has been an interesting character in the Marvel Universe. Although vampires do exist in the Marvel Universe, Blade being the most famous of Marvel's vampire, Morbius isn't really a vampire - that's why he's the 'Living Vampire'. 

Creation
Morbius debuted in the early-1970s when the now infamous Comics Code Authority started amending their draconian rules; fearing that the big publishers would abandon the Code, something which happened anyway, they started reforming some of their rules. One of the rules they amended was lifting the ban on featuring the walking dead, vampires, ghouls, zombies, and werewolves. Marvel decided to jump straight into the supernatural genre - after all, Stan Lee had worked on the supernatural comics of the 1940s and 1950s which were killed off by the Code. As Lee was working on a movie screenplay, and Spider-Man creator Steve Ditko had moved on by the 1970s, the task of creating a vampire antagonist for Spider-Man fell to one of Marvel's biggest writers - Roy Thomas. Years later, Thomas would be quoted as saying 'We were talking about doing Dracula, but Stan wanted a costumed villain. Other than that, he didn't specify what we should do'. Teaming up with artist Gil Kane they ended up creating Morbius the Living Vampire. Thomas was inspired by a movie he had watched years ago, and Kane modelled their living vampire off of actor Jack Palance. As a result, Morbius made his debut in The Amazing Spider-Man #101 in 1971 becoming one of the earliest vampiric characters in comics for decades.

Origins

Morbius debuted in The Amazing Spider-Man #101, but his origin was explained in the next issue through flashbacks. Dr. Michael Morbius was a Greek scientist specialising in biochemistry; he was such an expert in his field that he even won the Nobel Prize. However, he began developing a blood disorder which was slowly wasting him away. Not wanting to slowly die he began trying to find a cure, and he relied on a mixture of vampire bat DNA and electroshock therapy - if you notice a similarity between Batman's Man-Bat it is no coincidence. DC similarly wanted to take advantage of the Code's reforms, so also introduced their vampire-like villain in the comics of one of their most popular characters. Just like DC's Kirk Langstrom, Morbius's experiments went wrong and made his situation worse. Although he no longer suffered from his debilitating disease, his body underwent changes. He gained the ability to 'psionic glide', rapid health regeneration, super-speed, super-agility, and super-strength. However, at the same time, he became reliant on drinking fresh blood to survive, became injured by sunlight, became pale, grew sharp canines, and his nose flattened to resemble of bat's. Unlike actual vampires, he was a 'living vampire'. Morbius was still alive and lacked some of their weaknesses - he is unaffected by garlic, religious icons, and he cannot be killed by sunlight. When he does bite someone, and doesn't kill them, he too can create other living vampires - he can control these new vampires and he is far stronger than they are.

Now to his debut - in typical Spider-Man and Marvel fashion it is over-the-top. In The Amazing Spider-Man #100 Spider-Man grew four extra arms - finally he was a 'Spider-Man' having eight limbs. Wanting to reverse this he tried to find the Lizard - a scientist who, just like Morbius, tried to use animal DNA to help his body, but ended up turning him into an anthropomorphic lizard. Morbius moved to New York hoping that it could offer a place for him to research a cure for his condition. However, in his blood thirst, he slaughtered the crew of the ship which brought him to New York - just like Dracula slaughtering the crew which brought him to Britain. Unlike Dracula, with his blood thirst cured he is guilt-ridden, so tries, and fails, to kill himself. Secluding himself in what he thinks is an abandoned building, it is actually where Spider-Man and Curt Connors (the human form of the Lizard) are working on the cure for their conditions. When it fails, a frustrated Spider-Man smashes their test tubes waking up Morbius. Powered by blood-lust he attacked and almost killed Spider-Man unlike Connors, now transformed into Lizard, stopped him. During the battle Morbius bites Lizard partially transforming him back to Connors. Realising that Morbius holds the cure the duo track him across New York, and eventually extract his blood curing him - Spider-Man permanently, Connors wasn't as lucky.

Other Appearances

Since his debut Morbius has periodically appeared in a wide range of comics - sometimes as a villain and sometimes as an anti-hero. In Marvel Team-Up #3 his fiance Martine Bancroft tracked Morbius to the United States. One of the reasons why he travelled across continents was through the fear that he could lose control and kill Martine. She was adament that she could help Morbius, in fact she would be one of the regular occurring characters associated with Morbius. Naturally, she knew the smartest people around could help the vampire, so she tracked down the Fantastic Four. Together the Human Torch and Spider-Man tried to capture Morbius, but he was too strong and managed to flee. In 1973, to get around the Comics Code Authority Marvel started publishing magazines with maturer content and one of these was Vampire Tales. Among the stories to find its way into the 11-issues were those including Blade, and an adaptation of one of the earliest vampire novels - The Vampyr. Morbius was featured in most of the issues, and this would pave the way for his regular appearance in Marvel's Adventure into Fear which began publishing in 1974. He would periodically appear until 1992 when he gained his own title which lasted for 32 issues. This was to tie into the Midnight Sons. Dr Strange regularly formed temporary teams to act as hit squads into the wider Multiverse - when a supernatural threat appeared he could send them to swiftly deal with it. The same year Morbius debuted, one of Strange's teams also debuted - The Defenders. The Midnight Sons were formed to stop demonic and supernatural threats seemingly by the Ghost Riders Johnny Blaze and Danny Ketch in Ghost Rider Vol.3 #28, but behind the scenes it was due to Dr Strange. Morbius fought alongside the Ghost Riders, Damien Hellstorm the Son of Satan, sorceress Jennifer Hale, and Werewolf-by-Night. Among their foes have included the Mother of Demons Lilith and zombies from the Marvel Zombies universe. Of course, Morbius has had run-ins with Blade - during Civil War he even registered with the government in an effort to get Blade to.

Morbius has had a sporadic history, and often with other bigger characters - most notably Blade or the Midnight Sons - so that's where we will leave it for today. I hope you found it interesting, and for future blog updates please see our Facebook or catch me on Twitter @LewisTwiby.

Sunday, 19 January 2020

World History: The Middle East and Imperialism

Egyptian Revolution of 1919
As we have seen in previous World History posts, the nineteenth and early-twentieth century saw European states becoming powerful and proceeding to colonise the rest of the world. The Middle East is often overlooked in this narrative, largely as formal European colonies, outside of North Africa that is, were not formed until after World War One. When they are discussed it is often viewed through the lens of decline, the famous Ottoman Empire, for example, became known as the 'Sick Man of Europe'. However, Middle Eastern states did not simply see exploitation; states tried to negotiate their power and tried to resist foreign exploitation. If we want to understand exactly why the Middle East has become what it is today, it is important to look at this time period. Today's events are either a direct response to the events which we'll discuss today, or the seeds of today's events were planted during this period. As the Middle East and North Africa were an incredibly diverse region split over several different states we'll largely look just at Turkey, Egypt, and Iran, but we will at times discuss other areas of the region - such as the Arabian peninsula.

The Shift - c.1800

The last decade of the eighteenth century and the first of the nineteenth saw a shift in the Middle East. The same year that the French Revolution broke out Selim III became Ottoman sultan, and he wanted the empire to change. Selim saw the height of the Ottoman empire being under Suleiman, and hoped that, through reform, the empire's strength could be resurrected. In a precursor to what will trouble his successors Selim opened embassies in Europe, and invited Europeans to help create a new military called the nizam-i jedid (new order). Previously, the military and bureaucracy had been controlled by the Janissaries who had become so powerful that they could appoint sultans. Selim's reforms proved short lived. Local landowners, who were taxed to fund the nizam-i jedid, and Janissaries were angered by the reforms and deposed Selim in 1806 to be executed the next year. Meanwhile, another great shock impacted another area of the empire - Egypt. Aiming to both cut British access to India and copy his idol of Alexander the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte invaded in 1798. Although welcomed by the more reform-minded elite and traders eager to do business with the French, Napoleon's forces quickly upset the locals. When the French forces were stranded after the British destroyed the fleet in Aboukir Bay they became increasingly willing to loot Egyptian cities, they even desecrated important mosques. In 1801 a joint British-Ottoman expedition wiped out the French forces, and in the ensuing power vacuum an Albanian commander called Muhammad Ali was appointed pasha, governor, of Egypt. Muhammad Ali would radically shape Egypt, but the Napoleonic invasion shattered an image of the secure, albeit decentralised, empire. The Ottoman holdings in the Balkans began breaking off - often with European help - with Greece waging a decade long war from 1821.

Meanwhile, a new power rose in Iran. Originally a Turkish tribe in Azerbaijan the Qajars began expanding across Iran - in 1786 the managed to declare Tehran their capital and in 1796 managed to declare the Qajar dynasty. Following the end of the Safavid dynasty in 1736 Iran had lacked a strong dynasty which allowed the Qajars to take control. The first shah, Agha Mohammad, had to give autonomy to many local rulers and institutions. As the Safavids emerged through a Shi'a religious movement this allowed them to have little opposition from the important religious institutions; the Qajars could not claim this and the Iranian mujtahids would offer an alternate source of power to the Qajar shahs. Agha Mohammad would not reign for long - he was assassinated in 1797. Unlike contemporaries in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, the Qajars would never successfully establish some form of central authority.

Egypt - The First Reforms

Muhammad Ali would establish a dynasty which would rule Egypt, for better or for worse, until the 1950s. Similar to the Ottoman Empire, the Egyptian military and bureaucracy was ran by a class called the Mamluks; like the Janissaries they were the elite of Egyptian society, and became an entrenched class. Unlike Selim III Muhammad Ali would wait until after the dissolving of the Mamluks before creating the nizam-i jedid. After years of slowly chipping away their power, in March 1811 the leading Mamluks were invited for a banquet in Cairo where they were killed enabling Muhammad Ali to dissolve them. With the conservative Mamluks destroyed it allowed Muhammad Ali to reform education, administration, and the military. A European-inspired military and navy were implemented, and attempts to create new military ranks were done through authoritarian means. Expeditions to Sudan were made to enslave 20,000 people in order to create a slave army - brutal treatment and dehumanisation meant that most were killed. As a result, a nizam-i jedid was created in 1822 made out of conscripted peasants, and proved to be the backbone of Muhammad Ali's new army. Expeditions to Sudan were done for gold and slaves, they were sent to Greece in the War of Independence, and even against the Ottomans themselves when they invaded Syria in the 1830s as Muhammad Ali was angered that the sultan had gone back on the promise to award him Crete. Military reforms not the only ones which Muhammad Ali undertook.

Reforms in administration, land, industry, and education were all undertaken. New administrative divisions were created where Muhammad Ali appointed loyalists as governors to rule over Egyptian fellahin (peasants). Furthermore, new government departments were created in War, Navy, Finance, Industry, and Foreign Affairs with specialised schools being established to fill them. It was clear that Muhammad Ali viewed his role in a decentralised Ottoman Empire as being more than just a simple pasha. Similar to Japan and China during this period, students were sent to Europe in order to gain an education, and return to Egypt to serve as bureaucrats. During his rule 311 students were sent to France, Britain, Italy, and Austria in order to fill the new administration. This existed alongside the first Arabic newspaper to be produced in the 1820s, and a printing press to publish educational works in Arabic, Turkish, and Persian. This was to create a literate elite in order to guide Egypt to his idealised 'modern' state. The first tentative steps towards industrialisation also began in order to 'make Egypt part of Europe' - the first factories were made, canals and irrigation were repaired to encourage efficient crop production, and state monopolies were established to ensure the state could gain the profits. By the 1840s a third of the labour force were under state control, and 80% of agricultural produce was in state hands. However, Muhammad Ali's plans were hampered by a lack of resources, like coal, to power the heavy industry which he wanted, and the primarily rural nation meant there were few urban workers needed for industrial work. His invasion of Syria came to a crushing end when Britain helped the central Ottoman state the Egyptians, and the ensuing London Convention forced him to reduce the size of his military in return for having his own dynasty. This would begin European dictation of Egyptian affairs.

The Ottomans and Tanzimat
Fuad Pasha
Attempts to reform the Ottoman Empire did not end with Selim III's murder. A later sultan, Mahmud II, worked to slowly undermine the Janissaries so in 1826 he could wipe them out in the 'Auspicious Incident' of 1826. Under Mahmud a reformer called Mustafa Rashid Pasha became increasingly important, so when Mahmud died in 1839 he could greatly influence the new sultan Abdulaziz. Rashid's protegees Fuad and Ali further allowed the Tanzimat reforms to continue after the death of Rashid. In 1839 the two released the Edict of Gulhane beginning a period known as the 'Tanzimat' - reorganisation. The aim of the Tanzimat was to create a 'modern' Ottoman Empire by reorganising different aspects of society. Despite being a top-down reform movement it paved the way for bottom-up implementation of these ideas in later years. Just like in Egypt, new educational, administrative, and military reforms were implemented to placate both internal separatists and to show foreign powers that the Ottomans were modern. The earliest edicts, including equality before the law regardless of religion, guarantees to property, and a new tax system were possibly done to gain British support against the forces of Muhammad Ali. Later reforms involved simplifying taxation, abolishing the death penalty, developing consultative assemblies, and a wide range of new schools. From 1847 a series of new secular schools were created, and foreign religious schools were also opened to create ties between Europe and the Empire. Mainly, these were Protestant and Catholic mission schools, but there was also the Jewish Alliance Israelite Universelle. Although very conservative the first schools for women were opened in 1863 - like many other women's schools at the time it was created with the idea of creating good Muslim wives and mothers. Some upper-class women were able to study abroad, and religious minorities had access to some mission schools. Christians, for example, had access to the American College for Girls, first opened in 1871, until 1891 when it was opened to non-Christians. One of the major Turkish women's leaders, Halide Edip,  was the first Muslim woman to graduate from there. The traditional religious communities, the ulama, constantly criticised this, and proved to be one of the major undermining factors limiting the Tanzimat.
The aftermath of the 1860 Revolt
The Tanzimat also aimed to create a united Ottoman state. Although the millets, quasi-autonomous communities for minorities, still remained in existence the Tanzimat reduced their autonomy in order to create loyalty solely to the sultan. A key part of this was the rise of nationalism in the Ottoman lands - soon enough Romania and Bulgaria would also break off from the empire. There was also another issue that if Christian communities were attacked it would give foreign powers even more excuses to intervene. During the Tanzimat period the Crimean War broke out as France and Russia clashed over who could intervene in Ottoman affairs. This was particularly frightening for Ottoman officials when looking at Mount Lebanon. The region had long been a site of refuge for religious dissidents, especially Christian Maronites and the Druzes, and the Egyptian invasion would cause clashes. Muhammad Ali's son Ibrahim was placed in charge of Syria - back then a region consisting of modern Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and Palestine. The clashes caused resentment which spilled over during the Tanzimat. Maronites became increasingly wealthier thanks to new educational institutes and commercial ties with Europe. The resentment broke out into communal violence in 1860 and to avoid French involvement Fuad Pasha himself went to Mount Lebanon to see that Muslims who killed Maronites were punished. A new political system was made, a mutasarrifiyyah, that was partially guaranteed by European powers. This effectively showed the flaws of the Tanzimat. The reliance on foreign powers meant that the Ottomans became increasingly in their debt. The period came crashing down in 1876. When Abdulaziz tried to reassert his power a political crisis caused his resignation and the introduction of a new constitution, but his successor, Abdul Hamid, was firmly against reform.

Reformers and Radicals
Al-Afghani
Throughout the 1800s new ideas started being spread. In the Arabian peninsula the Wahhabi movement began emerging. Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab was educated in Mecca and Medina during the 1700s, and began preaching that Muslims had to return to the teaching of Islam, in the words of Albert Hourani, 'understood by the followers of Ibn Hanbal: strict obedience to the Qu'ran and Hadith...and rejection of all that could be regarded as illegitimate innovations.' Local chieftain Muhammad ibn Sa'ud started supporting the Wahhabi thought, and his presence along key trade routes allowed the spreading of his polito-religious forces, so much so that in 1803 he captured Mecca. As Wahhabi thought declared that the Ottomans were not the protectors of Islam the sultan sent Muhammad Ali to destroy the movement. Although military defeated, Wahhabism became ingrained in the region, and set the stage for the modern Saudi state's religious ideology. Meanwhile, in Iran, emerged Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. Kumari Jayawardena has placed great emphasis on al-Afghani's rhetoric inspiring anti-imperialist and liberatory ideas in the Islamic world during this period. Living across states across Europe and Asia, largely as he kept on being exiled, he called for Pan-Islamic unity and anti-absolutism. In al-Urwah al-Wuthqa he said that Islam had fallen into decadence and stagnation, so they had to abandon superstition and unite with one another. Especially among young Muslims his advocacy against accepting the status quo was well received. An Egyptian student of his, Muhammad Abduh, became a key figure in Egyptian law arguing that modernity and Islam were not mutually exclusive.

There were secular movements to emerge as well. In Turkey a group of scholars, inspired by French writing, formed a group named the Young Ottomans. The key figures in this were Namik Kemal, Ibrahim Sinasi, and Ziya Pasha who all lived in France due to oppression back at home. Sinasi himself even took part in the Paris Revolution of 1848, and in 1862 began a Turkish journal criticising the regime. In particular, they said that all people, regardless of ethnicity and faith, should be welcomed as equal citizens into Ottoman society. The Young Ottomans themselves remained in exile for most of their lives, but their writings would inspire new generations of radicals and reformers. Among them was Fatima Aliye who in 1892 wrote the novel Muhadarat, (Womanhood), stating that traditional culture held women back, and she would help found A Newspaper for Ladies, one of the key early feminist regular publications. In 1889 the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) was formed to resist the Ottoman sultan's repression. They are now better known as the Young Turks. Unlike earlier movements they were firmly secular, nationalist, and pro-West, so much so that some of their rhetoric shows the xenophobia Westerners had towards the Middle East. Ahmad Muhtar stated that 'Either we westernize, or we are destroyed', while Abdullah Cevdet would write 'There is no second civilization; civilization means European civilization and it must be imported with both its roses and thorns.' The Young Turks also proudly called themselves Turkish, something which had previously been used as an insult.

Egypt - Becoming a Colony
Opening the Suez Canal
Despite earlier defeats Egypt tried to rebuild itself, its rulers adopted the title 'khedive' - a distinguished title in Persian. One of the key rulers was Khedive Ismail who had the view that 'Egypt was part of Europe.' He began an expansive and ambitious project designed to bring Egypt closer to Europe, at times quite literally. Capitulations, something which also emerged in the Ottoman Empire and Iran, allowed foreign subjects to not exempt from Egyptian law, instead they answered to the laws of their own country. In order to enter the European market Ismail invested heavily in cotton production during the American Civil War, and it quickly collapsed after the end of the war. A series of new schools aimed to craft an elite along European lines. In 1872 the Dar al-Ulum was formed to retrain religious school graduates along European lines, in 1868 the School of Languages was reopened as a more elitist and European institution, and in 1873 Ismail's wife Jashem Afet Hanum formed the Suyfiyya Girls School which soon had 400 pupils. Most famously is the creation of the Suez Canal. In 1854 Ferdinand de Lesseps was given a concession to construct the canal, and when Ismail became khedive he invested a large fraction of Egypt's wealth into the construction. To much pomp and international celebrations the Suez Canal was opened in 1869, but Ismail had bankrupted the country. With over 60,000 being conscripted to work on the canal this reduced crop output, and taxes for peasants rose by 75% within three years. A negotiation for money with landowners gave him a quick reprieve, but weakened the state's leverage over the landlords. In 1875 he was forced to sell his 44% shares in the canal to Britain, but this didn't stop Egypt from being declared bankrupt in 1876. In 1879 the debts forced him to abdicate in favour of Tawfiq, and soon enough a rebellion broke out. Ahmad Urabi was a fellahin who became important in the army, and was seen as an authentic voice for the Egyptian people. In January 1881 Urabi led a mutiny against a law preventing Egyptians from rising in the army, but it soon evolved into a movement against autocracy and imperial domination. With popular support, 'Egypt for the Egyptians', Urabi was brought into government. Britain and France disliked such a popular nationalist being in power, and used a nationalist riot in June 1882 in Alexandria to invade. Urabi was exiled to Sri Lanka and Britain established the 'veiled protectorate' of Britain.
The Dinshaway Hangings
Lord Cromer was made 'counsel-general' of Egypt, a polite term for the governor as officially the Ottomans still ruled in Egypt. Cromer had a low view of the Islamic states, his diaries from his time in Iran are full of phrases such as 'Oriental despotism.' While some of Cromer's policies can be considered progressive - such as banning the usage of whips - only the wealthy benefited from British rule. Cotton mills were discouraged, as it could compete with British cotton production, but cotton growing was encouraged making fellahin increasingly indebted. Cromer had also been an official in the British Raj, and viewed education as a way that nationalists could be created. As a result he tried to limit the implementation of higher education, and cut funding to build new schools. Only after Cromer left his position was the Egyptian University in Cairo created in 1908. Cromer was further well known for his despotism. While he opposed the construction of schools he was in favour of building prisons, and eagerly used forced labour to enforce his building projects. In 1906 British officers went pigeon shooting, something very dangerous for local peoples who heavily relied on pigeons for their livelihoods. At the village of Dinshaway soldiers clashed with villagers and two soldiers were injured - one died later, largely from heat stroke. Cromer came down hard. The 52 villagers were tried, 34 were convicted, and four were hanged with the remaining 30 being flogged. This caused a national outrage so bad that Cromer was forced to resign. Mustafa Kamil, editor of the paper al-Liwa, formed the Watani Party, made mostly of urban men, to campaign for Egyptian freedom. Following the First World War, when Egyptian lawyer Sa'd Zaghlul formed the wafd, delegation, Egyptians hoped his presence at Versailles could allow the Allied powers to hear their plight. Britain responded by arresting the Wafd's leaders and exiling them to Malta. An uprising, largely led by women, then broke out in 1919 which only stopped when Zaghlul was allowed to attend Versailles.

Iran's Troubles
Rebels in the Constitutional War
The shah through most of the 1800s, Nasir al-Din (1848-1896), like his contemporaries tried to reform the state. However, this was hard for several reasons. Mainly, it was due to the Qajar dynasty having little formal power outside of Tehran. As stated earlier, tribes and religious institutes remained powerful politically and militarily. Through this it was also hard to make them pay taxes so there was a serious lack of funds. When taxes were paid it wasn't to the state. Instead the religious councils collected the zakat taxes, and instead they used it to fund schools. Early on the Cossack Brigade was created in 1879, but it was small at around 3,000 and was dominated by imported Russian officers. An institute of higher learning, the Dar al-Fun, was created in 1851 which was staffed by Europeans, but it remained an extremely elite institute. An observer in the 1870s reported that there were only 70 students. All this was not helped by Nasir al-Din himself - the public widely viewed him as doing nothing and living a life of luxury. Like elsewhere, Iran became a debtor state as foreign states, largely Britain and Russia, began extracting more and more concessions devastating local economies. The bazaaris, merchants, were especially affected as they now were pushed out by European companies. In 1890 Britain was given exclusive right to control Iran's tobacco crop. Al-Afghani, who was an adviser to the shah, resigned and nationalist protests broke out. In 1891 the religious bodies intervened when a Shiraz mujtahid declared that using tobacco went against the Hidden Imam, if anyone was reluctant to join the protests now enthusiastically did so. The shah rescinded the concession within the year, but it did not help him and in 1896 he was assassinated. The Qajars continued to face colonial exploitation; in something which will shape Iran's history William Knox D'Arcy in 1909 was granted oil concessions forming the Anglo-Persiab Oil Company, now called BP. Seeing revolution in 1905 break out in Russia protests broke out demanding economic equality, education, and democracy. From 1906 to 1911 a small scale civil war broke out over whether Iran would have a Madjles, a parliament. Throughout the First World War it would be occupied by the Allied powers to secure their access to the oilfields, and the second Madjles was dissolved. Within a decade the Qajar dynasty was ousted in favour of Reza Khan Pahlavi, a colonel in the Cossack Brigade.

Abdul Hamid and the Young Turks

The end of the Tanzimat was followed by decades of authoritarian rule by Sultan Abdul Hamid, known as 'the Butcher' or 'Red Sultan' for his cracking down on nationalist and reformist/republican movements. The cautious advocacy of secularism, 'Ottomanism' or 'laicism', of the Tanzimat was replaced by an advocacy of Pan-Islam to work for him domestically and internationally. The Ottoman sultan also claimed the title of caliph, so he emphasised this to ensure loyalty to him from his Muslim subjects and as a bargaining chip with foreign powers. There was an implication that, as caliph, he could encourage revolts in their Muslim-majority colonies, so they had to give him concessions. To show that he was a representative of Pan-Islam, but also continuing some Tanzimat policies, the Hijaz railway was constructed connecting Medina to Damascus, and 51 new secondary schools were constructed in the Asian provinces. However, there were subtle limits to this. The schools were taught along European lines and were centralised - this limited the impact religious institutions had on education. Railways were also constructed connecting Istanbul to Vienna creating the renowned 'Oriental Express', and ties were created with Germany. A Berlin-to-Baghdad railroad was formed as a result, and Kaiser Wilhelm II even performed two state visits. However, Abdul Hamid was not known for peaceful rule. Political opponents were often forced to go into exile to avoid repression, and the CUP were largely based elsewhere until the 1900s. Nationalism also resulted in brutality. Despite his advocacy for Pan-Islam, Arabs became distrustful of Ottoman rule when Abdul Hamid replaced influential Arabic families who were pro-Tanzimat with his own supporters - something seen as 'Turkifying' the Arabic areas. Throughout the 1890s Armenian nationalist uprisings resulted in Abdul Hamid massacring Armenian villages, and Greece declared war in 1897 thanks to the repression of an uprising on Crete. He was also almost assassinated in 1905 by Armenian nationalists. His repression led to the growth of nationalism across the empire - when the First World War broke out Arabs soon revolted to create their own state and Armenians also attempted to ally Russian troops.

Troops stationed in Salonika, the Third Army, were sympathetic to the CUP and opposed the sultan, so they staged a revolt in 1908 inspired by Ottomanism. Abdul Hamid won some support back for allowing elections, a demand of the troops, but a counterrevolution broke out to restore the sultan's power. The Third Army formally deposed him, and to keep with Ottomanism, sent a delegation consisting of two Turks, an Armenian, and Jewish officer were sent to inform the sultan of his deposition. However, the CUP was heavily divided between liberals and conservatives which was made worse when Balkan states in 1912 took over the European lands. In 1913, a triumvirate under Enver, Talat, and Jamal Pasha (they were unrelated, until the Ataturk era your job title was your family name), took control. They would move between authoritarianism and reformism which helps explain why it became to embrace a specifically Turkish identity. For example, Arabs saw the replacement of Hamidian era notable Arabic families as further attempts to Turkify the empire. Through this, we can see why in the First World War they began seeing the Armenian, Greek, and Assyrian population as a fifth column beginning a genocide - a topic for a later post.

Aftermath and Conclusion
Women in Egypt, 1919
The events which we have discussed today have set the stage for the Middle East's history up until today. Nationalism would lead to genocide of Armenians and the breaking up of the Ottoman Empire, however, the legacy of European intervention meant that many of the former parts of the empire became colonies. The aspirations of Arab nationalists to create a united Arabic nation was squashed by the Sykes-Picot Agreement dividing the area between British and French colonies - these colonies would later be further divided. The reformist movements would bring to power new movements which would shape today. The new Pahlavi dynasty in Iran would continue to grant foreign powers concessions spurring an anti-imperialist movement - from both Leftists and Islamic forces (sometimes they were the same). From the CUP emerged the reformist Mustafa Kemal, later known as Ataturk, and, according to Serif Mardin, would complete the ideas set forth in the Tanzimat. Since then the divide between Kemalism and its opponents have been a characteristic of Turkish thought. The Middle East as we know it began to take shape during this period, for better or for worse.

The sources I have used are as follows:
-William Cleveland and Martin Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, Sixth Edition, (Boulder, CO: 2016)
-Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, (London: 1991)
-Kumari Jayawardena, Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World, (London: 1986)
-Betty Anderson, A History of the Modern Middle East: Rulers, Rebels and Rogues, (Stanford, CA: 2016)
-Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt, (Berkeley, CA: 1988)
-Ervand Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran, (Cambridge: 2008)
-Serif Mardin, 'Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution', International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2:2, (1971), 197-211
-Nicole Pope and Hugh Pope, Turkey Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey, (Woodstock, NY: 2004)
-Yaseen Noorani, Culture and Hegemony in the Colonial Middle East, (New York, NY: 2010)
-John Galbraith and Afaf Latfi al-Sayyid-Marsat, 'The British Occupation of Egypt: Another View,' International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 9:4, (1978), 471-488
-A.G. Hopkins, 'The Victorians and Africa: A Reconsideration of the Occupation of Egypt, 1882,' The Journal of African History, 27:2, (1986), 363-391

Thank you for reading, and next time we'll be looking at settler colonialism in Australia and New Zealand. For other World History posts we have a list here, and for future blog updates please see our Facebook or catch me on Twitter @LewisTwiby.

Sunday, 12 January 2020

The Quagga and Colonialism

This article was first published by Retrospect Journal on 02/12/2019, and can be read here.

On 12 August 1883 the last known quagga died in captivity in Amsterdam Zoo, surveys could find no traces of quagga in the wild confirming its extinction. Long thought to be a species of zebra, DNA tests in the 1980s found it to be a subspecies, it was once common across the plains of what would become South Africa. Unlike other infamous cases of animals being driven to extinction by human activity, most notably the moa of New Zealand and dodo of Mauritius, quagga had lived alongside humans for millennia. In fact, the name ‘quagga’ partially comes from the local Khoikhoi name. Instead the extinction of the quagga was deeply entwined with imperial culture and the formation of settler rule in South Africa.

From the early-1600s Dutch settlers created colonies on the southern coast of what would become South Africa. From 1795 the British took over the colony to secure shipping routes to India, and clashes began between the Dutch and British settlers. To avoid British rule the Dutch farmers began what has since been known as the ‘Great Trek’ after 1836; these ‘voortrekkers’ would later become a key part of Afrikaner national identity, especially as British rule tried to reassert itself over the voortrekkers. The white settlers claimed they were pushing into ‘free’ land where they could make a new start, however, this claim was at the expense of Africans. Although there was no intensive sedentary farming, that did not mean that the land was actually unclaimed. Various African peoples made claim to the lands hosting a range of different states and economic structures ranging from pastoralists to small-scale farming to the expansionist Zulu Empire. These voortrekkers enslaved or displaced Africans from their land, and helped destabilise the Zulu Empire to prevent them from being a threat. 

The arrival of Europeans changed how the environment was treated. Although it is important not to fetishize pre-colonial land usage, wide-scale pastoralism had caused increased pressure on the land in Zulu and Xhosa communities, but it is important to stress how land usage shifted dramatically. Just as in the American West, land areas of the southern African land were divided between individual farms – of varying sizes – which limited where wild animals could move. For herding animals, like the quagga, wide areas are needed so they have plenty of food to eat without destroying the local area – millions of zebra and wildebeest make the trek from the Serengeti in Tanzania to the Masai Mara in Kenya for this reason every year. Herds of quagga, therefore, tried to go on their regular grazing grounds but were faced with Boer farms. To prevent the quagga from competing with their own grazing herds, or from eating their own crops, farmers resorted to shooting stray herds of quagga. Quagga meat was also a good way to get quick food without killing off a possibly prized animal, and their skins could be sold for extra funds.

At the same time, the quagga became a prized animal for menageries back in the metropole. The quagga’s unique skin made it an interesting addition for any wealthy elite’s personal collection – Cusworth Hall in my own town of Doncaster even had quagga grazing on its grounds in the 1700s. When the first zoological gardens started emerging in the 1820s, such as London Zoo, quaggas were in high demand for their appearance and for colonial experiments. Naturalists hoped to breed quaggas with horses to create a new species that could be used in both Europe and Africa. There is also an underlying colonial ideology about why exotic animals were in demand for zoos and menageries. As argued by Harriet Ratvo, having a seemingly rare, unique, or exotic animal was part of a wider imperial power dynamic – if you could have an animal from a colonised region it showed by the power of empire and your own wealth. It showed Britain’s power to move an animal across the world, and the owner’s importance by engaging in this power play.

However, many zoos were unequipped to look after exotic animals initially, and it was not uncommon for new animals to die within a year. London Zoo’s A.D. Bartlett, who oversaw the animal population during the late-nineteenth century, wrote how they had to invest a lot to look after elephants and rhinos because they were hard to get, but as monkeys were cheap to obtain, they did not have to worry in case they died. Initially the quagga was viewed this way. Their large herd sizes and apparent abundancy meant that they were seen as dispensable, but still sought after, animals. Furthermore, brutal capture and transport of animals meant that many more had to be caught than what was needed due to high mortality.

These factors mentioned are what drove the quagga to extinction. Demand to fill zoos in Europe, and policies of extermination to preserve farms in Africa, meant that quagga numbers quickly dwindled. As they were only found in southern Africa it meant that the population rapidly went extinct – although common, they were only common in one area. London Zoo’s single mare was photographed five times between the 1860s and 1870s before she died by the zoo’s chief photographer Frederick York. The rapid extinction of the quagga meant that they are the only photos of a living quagga. The last known wild quagga was shot in 1878, and when the last one died in captivity in 1883 the zoo requested hunters find another one not realising how quickly it had gone extinct. Albeit, locally all zebras were referred to as ‘quaggas’ which may have caused the confusion. Thanks to colonial settlement and exploitation the quagga had gone extinct.

Studying the quagga shows the various ways colonialism impacted colonised societies. Unfortunately, the quagga was not the only case of settler colonialism driving animals to extinction – passenger pigeons, thylacines, and almost the bison suffered the same fate. The quagga offers a warning for the future. Neo-colonialism means the natural world is being destroyed in order to fund the economies of the global north threatening both humans and nature. Colonialism very likely will drive orang-utans, macaws, and caimans, just to name a few, to extinction.

Sunday, 5 January 2020

Left-Wing and the 'Other' History: The Zapatistas

*Part of this post has been adapted from an essay written by myself for the University of Edinburgh

On January 1 1994 in the forests of Chiapas, southern Mexico an uprising took place. An armed libertarian socialist group calling themselves the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, (the Zapatista National Liberation Army), better known as the EZLN, or the Zapatistas. Originating as a white or mestizo guerrilla movement in 1983 they quickly evolved into a movement specifically fighting for indigenous and women's rights - they believed, and still do, that the liberation of oppressed groups can be done through socialism. Today we will be taking a quick look at the EZLN's history, and what they believe.

Origins 
Chiapas is one of the most southernmost states in Mexico, bordering Guatemala, and was deeply divided. Despite being rich in natural resources with good farmland most of the population were landless and in poverty. This was heavily racialised as well. Despite most of the population being indigenous and having a long history of resistance to exclusion, quoting Philip Russell, ‘for centuries, Indians and non-Indians have occupied separate domains’.  The distance between neighbouring communities lends itself to othering – a lack of understanding leads to the reinforcement of stereotypes – but what reinforced the subalternity of Chiapas’ indigenous population was exclusion from hegemonic society through poverty and racism. In 1990 30% of the adult population was illiterate, 34.9% had no access to electricity, 41.1% of workers relied on more than one minimum wage, and in the town of La Realidad a fifth of children died of curable diseases.  As these figures disproportionally affected indigenous communities this led to them becoming subalterns. Illiteracy prevents communities from engaging in wider civic society while low paid jobs and a lack of access to basic needs solidifies this exclusion. Indigenous communities cannot break their subalternity when basic rights to education, employment, and health care have already been denied to them, so access to these rights become the greater concern. These issues become accentuated by racism. A member of the Regional Union of Craftswomen of Chiapas, formed after the Zapatista Uprising, stated that ‘they [white and mestizo Mexicans] make fun of indígenas who come to school in their traditional clothes’.  The disparaging of indigenous clothing, and by extension culture, was due to their exclusion from accepted cultural hegemony – even if they could attend school they were still objectified as an ‘outsider’. 

Chiapas, however, had a long history of indigenous resistance dating as far back as to 1712 when indigenous peoples constantly tried to fight Spanish colonialism. The Zapatistas emerged as part of this long history of resistance, and can be firmly seen in their own name - 'Zapatista' was the name of the Mexican Revolution's radical revolutionary Emiliano Zapata. According to the Zapatistas, the practice something called 'neozapatismo' - a political philosophy emphasising liberation, collectivisation, radical democracy, feminism, and indigenous liberation. Originally, the EZLN were not a movement for specifically women and indigenous rights, instead they emerged in Mexico City as a leftist guerrilla movement. Mainly white and mestizo students went to Chiapas, seeing it as Mexico's poorest region, with the intention of organising the local people. However, the reality on the ground changed drastically what they aims were. Poverty and oppression were intrinsically linked to gender and race, and the actions of indigenous activists helped shape the early EZLN. For example, in 1973 the First Indian Congress of Chiapas was formed. This aimed to bring activists together in order to implement education in indigenous languages; prevent the increasing commercialisation of Chiapas's main crop, coffee; and land redistribution for the primarily indigenous tenant farmers. A shift therefore happened. The guerrilla movement started moving towards indigenous liberation. Although the EZLN's most famous spokesperson is a white, or mestizo, figure with subcomandante Marcos, now called subcomandante Galeano, indigenous people started coming to the forefront. Marcos himself said that their most important weapon was the Tzotzil-speaking woman Comandante Ramona. Even the name EZLN came from this shift of perspective.

The Uprising
subcomandante Marcos
Through the 1980s neoliberalism started becoming the accepted economic policy across the world, and in North America this led to the creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This aimed to increasingly integrate the economies of the US, Canada, and Mexico by removing tariffs, eliminating barriers to trade, and making investment easier. However, this would have a devastating consequence on the poorest in society, especially in Mexico - labour laws were repealed and austerity measures were implemented as they were seen as inhibiting investment. This particularly affected the indigenous peoples of Chiapas as it meant the removal of Article 27 of the Constitution. Article 27 kept land reform and prevented foreign capitalists from owning Mexican resources - this revocation allowed foreign investors to take Chiapas's land further disenfranchising the landless. As a result, the EZLN began to act. In 1993 they issued the Lacandon Declaration, the first of several, declaring the illigetimacy of the government, and governmental reforms inspired by Emiliano Zapata's Plan of Ayala (1911). The day that NAFTA came into being, January 1 1994, the Zapatistas rose up. Coming from the Lacandon forest the Zapatistas captured the towns of Ocosingo, Las Margaritas, Altamirano, and San Cristobal de las Casas. The surprise uprising took the world by storm. Commentators said that the Mexican president 'went to sleep in a First World country' on New Years Eve and 'woke up in a Third World country' on New Years Day. 

The masked wearing, horse-riding insurgents caught international renown. Particularly, subcomandante Marcos won attention for his openness to interviews, charm, and knowledge of languages (he could speak Spanish, English, and two native languages). The high presence of women, and especially indigenous women, in the movement gave the impression that they practised what they preached - the capture of the capital of San Cristobal was done by Ana María, a Tzotzil-speaking woman. The rebellion caused a crisis for the Mexican government - a subaltern group had managed to unexpectedly rise up against their authority. Soon peace overtures were made, and the EZLN relied on a sympathetic bishop Samuel Ruiz Garcia to help negotiate.

*The next three sections will be taken from the aforementioned essay.

Indigenous Peoples and the EZLN

Perhaps the most central aspect of Zapatista rhetoric since 1994 has been the emancipation of indigenous Mexicans. The EZLN’s most famous spokesperson, Subcomandante Marcos (now Galeano), although not indigenous himself, has regularly evoked the image of liberating indigenous peoples in his writings. For example, in 1995 he wrote that thanks to EZLN the cost of indigenous blood was no longer ‘worth less than the backyard bird’ and that they ‘rose up so as not to live on their knees anymore’.  Marcos has presented the EZLN as preventing the further abuse of indigenous peoples, but he has gone beyond this by stating that ‘they rose up’. Instead of the EZLN fighting for indigenous communities, Marcos has presented the EZLN as fighting with indigenous communities. A regular feature of Zapatistas rhetoric since 1994 is the presentation that the EZLN answers to its communities. Two decades after the initial uprising EZLN officer Subcomandante Moises still stated that ‘The EZLN cannot interfere in [a] community’s life…Here, the people rule, while the government merely obeys’.  As communities had been historically excluded from political hegemony the logic behind these statements can be explained through subalternity. While the Mexican government ruled Chiapas, the Zapatistas have presented themselves as actually giving a voice to the ‘other’ – the subaltern guides their policy instead of the powerful guiding the subaltern. Similarly, in March 1994 the EZLN stated the reasons for their uprising was ‘The unbearable injustices and violations of our human rights as indigenous people and impoverished campesinos’, and ‘More than sixty years of lies, deceptions, promises, and imposed governments’.  The protection of indigenous rights is central to these demands, but by stating ‘our’ rights highlights Zapatista usage of the subaltern; they presented themselves as not just fighting for indigenous communities, but as members of the communities.

The Zapatistas have made attempts to practically represent and emancipate indigenous communities. As stated by anthropologist Lynn Stephen, who had worked in EZLN Muncipialities, ‘By 1994, the EZLN insurgents were indigenous people of Chiapas commanded from Chiapas’  which matches with Marcos’ own assertion on the day of the uprising that ‘The leaders are mostly indigenous’.  As indigenous Chiapans were leading the EZLN this ensures that the ‘other’ was not used just for rhetoric. Furthermore, by December 1994 several villages and ejidos (communal land) joined with Zapatistas to form the ‘Autonomous Municipalities’ rejecting government control.  The aim of the municipalities was to grant indigenous communities: autonomy; direct democracy; and access to land, education, and health care. We see a clear attempt to implement the March demands independently from the central government whom they mistrusted. As the ‘othered’ were crafting the Autonomous Municipalities we see the subaltern trying to break the oppression that came with being subaltern – they could now have access to land and education previously denied to them. This was expanded in August 2003 when the Municipalities were replaced with the ‘Caracoles’ (Snails) where they would ‘move slowly but forward’, as well as making the EZLN more accountable to local communities.  The legacy of misrule and subjugation has influenced how the EZLN viewed itself and how it wished to implement its policies – just as in their rhetoric they saw a desire to serve the communities, ‘mandar obeciendo’ (to command by obeying). The Municipalities and Caracoles were constructed in order to create direct contact between the Zapatista leadership and local communities, highlighting the importance of the subaltern. As indigenous peoples had been ruled by an exclusionary state the EZLN aimed to include subaltern communities into society.
A Caracoles mural
Furthermore, the EZLN has placed great emphasis on the Revolutionary Indigenous Clandestine Committee (CCRI) – a civilian body elected in popular assemblies, representing regions and ethnicities, and had greater authority than the Zapatista military command.  For the Zapatistas, the CCRI is a practical attempt to institute direct democracy and engage with local communities. Civilians ordered militias, and indigenous peoples could decide who encompassed the CCRI; democracy at a local level offered a chance for subaltern communities to actively engage in policy making. Since 1994 the Zapatistas ostensibly have subordinated themselves to civilian leadership. For example, the decision to put forward an indigenous woman, Marichuy, in the 2018 general election was due to the civilian-ran National Indigenous Congress (CNI) in 2016 seeing rebellion as not achieving the goals of 1994.  Although Galeano supported this measure it is important to note that it was the CNI, not the EZLN, who put forward this plan. As the Zapatistas were willing to engage in electoral politics and forsake armed revolt at the request of civilians it highlights how important the subaltern is in determining Zapatista policy. As civilians were guiding the policies of the Zapatistas the declaration of mandar obeciendo does not seem like empty rhetoric – it appears that the ‘other’ was genuinely influencing the EZLN.
Comandante Ramona
However, there are important limits to the rhetoric and actions concerning indigenous peoples. The centrality of Marcos is testament to this. Marcos is not indigenous, and many of the EZLN’s major comandantes, most notably Ramona, ‘shy away from interviews because their native tongue is Tzotzil’.  Lynn Stephen has further placed emphasis on Marcos’ own politics and love of history in influencing the ideas of the Zapatistas, specifically when he stated, ‘I went to teach what the people wanted: literacy and Mexican history’.  Marcos does not lead the Zapatistas, hence why he is known as ‘subcomandante’ and not ‘comandante’, but the reason for his centrality to the movement links to the subaltern nature of the EZLN. In his own words, he is a ‘person who comes from an urban culture, one of the world’s biggest cities, with a university education’ where Chiapas was ‘another planet’ to him initially compared to other Zapatista figures, most notably Ramona, who were rural and indigenous.  As Marcos came from the hegemonic culture he was more acceptable to Mexican society compared to a figure like Ramona, so he became the movement’s figurehead. The subalternity of the EZLN comandantes meant that they could not be legitimate in the eyes of the public, whereas the educated and non-indigenous could be used to grant them legitimacy. Consequently, the centrality of Marcos reinforced the subaltern rhetoric which the Zapatistas aimed to challenge – as they were indigenous, they had to use Marcos to be heard. 

Moreover, in the early stages of the uprising, insurgents in majority indigenous cities, like Oxchuc, came from wealthier families.  Although this has since changed, the initial domination of wealthier insurgents in the urban ranks of the Zapatistas further highlights the inability to fully strike against subalternity. Wealthier individuals had the mobility and agency to engage with the armed movement compared to their poorer neighbours who could not afford to engage in the uncertainty of an armed rebellion. This is further seen with the initial peace talks at San Andres in 1996. In violation of the ceasefire the military and paramilitary groups, particularly Paz y Justicia, increased their presence in Chiapas and attacked pro-Zapatista villages.  Unwilling to risk the peace talks the Zapatistas gave little aid and only threatened to pull out of the talks if the abuses against civilians continued. The inability to protect civilians, and the reliance on the state to accept the ceasefire, further highlights how the Zapatistas did not fully protect indigenous communities. Their own subaltern nature meant that the Mexican government felt that it could engage in human rights abuses, and break the terms of the ceasefire, as the EZLN could only look on. Prioritising peace with those with hegemonic power was an acquiescence of their own failing to break the state’s hegemony; they had only managed to briefly threaten the government and sustained resistance was not possible. Consequently, the military could continue brutalising communities regardless of Zapatista protests.

Women and the EZLN

Another key aspect to Zapatista identity is their rhetoric concerning women’s emancipation, and like with indigeneity, women have played an integral role in the EZLN. During the initial uprising it was Major Ana María who took the city hall of San Cristobal, one of Chiapas’ largest cities, and the CCRI itself was formed by Comandante Ramona.  Furthermore, it was Ramona who attended the San Andres talks in 1996 as ‘The Zapatistas say that Ramona, not Marcos, is their most ferocious weapon’.  The presence of indigenous women, both Ramona and Ana María were Tzotzil, in the highest positions of the Zapatistas indicates a clear attempt to emancipate subaltern communities. As women were able to physically lead the EZLN, including a body which superseded the movement’s armed wing, their claims of emancipating women do not become empty rhetoric. This is further seen in the twenty-ninth demand of the EZLN, the ‘Indigenous women’s petition’, which included demands that could practically alter the life of Chiapan women including day-cares and schools for women.  In these demands the Zapatistas have directly stated how they wish to dismantle patriarchal structures in order to emancipate subaltern women. Requests for day-cares, schools, and services to create co-operatives aimed to democratise domesticity and allow women to leave the domestic sphere, something which had historically reinforced patriarchy. During the ‘Other Campaign’ in 2005 – an attempt by the EZLN to create a united national alliance – Ramona was put forward as the one to represent the movement.  Ramona was to practically and symbolically show the importance of women in the EZLN; her existence in the movement was to show a rejection of patriarchy. The influence of women in the Zapatista leadership are key to understanding why this became a desire – coming from subaltern communities they understood what was stripping them of agency. 

Women further engaged with opportunities offered by the Zapatista uprising – primarily to challenge racism and misogyny which had forced them into a subaltern status. A part of this was due to a long history of indigenous female resistance to repression – in 1994, independent from the EZLN, indigenous women organised the Congress of Indigenous and Peasant Women of Chiapas in order to represent themselves.  Consequently, the emancipatory language of the EZLN strengthened women’s attempts to challenge their own subalternity. For example, Natalia, in the EZLN aligned Union of Craftswomen of Chiapas, argued that just a year after the rising ‘They [the authorities] treat us badly. But…there is more respect. Because now the indigenas know their rights’.  This partially could be explained by Natalia trying to show the benefits of the EZLN for the international community, but a desire to do so highlights subaltern support for the Zapatistas. In her interview Natalia felt that the EZLN were capable of representing women’s rights, and, slowly, bring about equality. Furthermore, in 1998 X’oyep women were visibly present at pro-Zapatista protests against increased military presence in Chiapas.  Women were willing to directly challenge the instrument of state repression in support of the Zapatistas showing that women actively engaged with the rhetoric of the EZLN. The urge to break subalternity helped influence women in directly defending those whom they believed would guarantee their own emancipation. As a result, the EZLN’s usage of the subaltern encouraged resistance against hegemonic power.

However, particularly in the first decade of the uprising, there was a notable gap between rhetoric and action. As argued by Hilary Klein, figures including Ana María and Ramona, were exceptions due to the continued presence of machismo which reinforced patriarchy.  This is shown by the number of women delegates to the National Democratic Convention in 1995 – only 19 out of 100.  Despite calls for the emancipation of women the Zapatistas failed themselves to represent women in their own leadership, and calls into question some of their demands. It is not clear who wrote the women’s petition, and although it was progressive it still reinforced the subalternity of women. The requests for day-cares and ovens for bakeries were specifically in the women’s petition and not the wider demands – for the EZLN childcare and cooking were still viewed as jobs for women. Mercedes Olivera found, through interviews with Zapatista women, that while pregnant women were expected to leave ranks in order to care for their child, new fathers were allowed to remain.  Continued subalternity of women meant that a gap emerged between action and rhetoric – the idea that women were the natural caregivers meant that, even in a supposed subaltern uprising, patriarchal views remained unchallenged. As figures like Ramona were exceptions in the EZLN leadership, this meant that rhetoric and policy were largely constructed by men, so hypocritical actions could occur without thorough questioning further marginalising Zapatista women. Although Marcos has shown his support for women taking lead roles, as seen in his statement that without women history ‘is nothing more than a badly-made fable’, his presence indirectly reinforces subordination of women.  Like with indigeneity, Marcos is thrust into public spotlight to grant legitimacy to the movement due to his own limited subaltern identity. The EZLN had the assumption that an indigenous woman, like Ramona, could not be the figurehead for the movement, so indirectly showed how degrading attitudes towards the subaltern continued in the EZLN’s ranks. 

However, since 2004 (when the EZLN looked at their actions after a decade of revolution) younger women have used their own subalternity, and the rhetoric of the Zapatistas, to challenge machismo within the EZLN’s ranks. For example, a Tojolabal woman in 2004 told Olivera that she felt bold enough to reject men if they wanted her to abandon her career in education.  This offers two insights: firstly, machismo continued despite a decade of the uprising; and secondly, the policies of the Zapatistas had encouraged women to become independent. Gaps between rhetoric and action, and the language of the EZLN, gave women the agency to challenge the continuation of their own oppression. In 2007, the Zapatistas formed a panel discussion for 200 women to express their desires, and criticisms, where men were barred from talking, and were asked to cook and clean if they wished to take part.  Women made their own spaces to discuss their own oppression, with no intervention from men, thanks to the idea of the subaltern. Zapatista rhetoric on autonomy created an avenue for women to express their own criticisms of misogyny in the EZLN, and a way for them to criticise their own subalternity. The idea of the subaltern, therefore, allowed the subaltern to express their existence. Similar to how the Municipalities and Caracoles aimed to grant autonomy for indigenous communities, the opportunities of self-rule gave women an opportunity to exercise their agency. Rosa Isabel of the Production Commission in 2007 stated that, ‘Working together in the women’s collective is where we get over the fear and embarrassment that we feel’.  This statement may have been made to show outside observers the success of the Zapatistas, but viewed uncritically it indicates how the idea of liberating the subaltern allowed women to liberate themselves. Working independent from women it shattered notions of female inferiority and limitations to domesticity. By creating their own agency women managed to actively challenge the patriarchal social structures which made them subalterns.

Reaction to the EZLN
Aftermath of the Acteal Massacre
The reaction to the Zapatistas by the Mexican state is intrinsically linked to the image of the subaltern which they have constructed. As argued by Antonio Gramsci, a ‘movement of the subaltern classes is accompanied by a reactionary movement…of the dominant class’.  In this case the Mexican state’s ‘reactionary movement’ was characterised by military and paramilitary violence, and the delegitimising of the movement – both actions were rooted in attitudes towards subalterns. The military and paramilitary groups, principally Paz y Justicia, reacted to the movement by primarily attacking unarmed, but pro-Zapatista, civilians. The most famous of these killings was the Acteal Massacre where 45 people, including children, of a pacifist group, Los Abejas, were shot on December 22, 1997 by the government backed paramilitary Mascara Roja. As Los Abejas supported the Zapatistas, but not the armed uprising, they were targeted by Mascara Roja.  As Los Abejas were pro-Zapatista and pacifist Tzotzils their subaltern nature made them a target for reactionary repression. Their indigeneity meant that they were already victims of repression, while their pacifism was seen as Los Abejas lacking agency making them ‘ideal’ targets. As the violent EZLN were seen as having agency, so were not targeted, Los Abejas’ pacifism was seen as a safe way to attack the Zapatistas. Furthermore, state-sanctioned repression disproportionally affected those ‘othered’ through multiple ways. The vast majority of the 6,000 people displaced by military attacks were poor women who were also regularly subjected to sexual assault as ‘punishment’ for association with Zapatistas.  Poor, indigenous women were so excluded from political hegemony that they were viewed as entirely lacking agency. It became acceptable for the military to target indigenous women as they lacked a voice to make their repression heard by those who could make the military accountable for their actions.

According to Bill Weinberg, the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in 1996 hoped that the Zapatistas would break the ceasefire so began increasing military presence and the funding of paramilitaries in Chiapas.  A subaltern uprising, especially when Mexico was positioning itself as a member of the ‘First World’ for its involvement in NAFTA, was incredibly damaging for the hegemonic structure of society. Furthermore, a subaltern rising had managed to bring the Mexican state to negotiation with the intention of radically changing indigenous life in Mexico. This helps explain the willingness of the PRI to continue harsh retaliation against the Zapatistas, or fund others to work on their behalf – an anonymous Paz y Justicia member alleged that ‘There was an agreement for 4,600 pesos…[with] The Mexican army and Public Safety’.  The EZLN had not only embarrassed Mexico internationally by rising on the day that NAFTA came into being, but by directly challenging state power as apparent subalterns had brought the state into negotiations. A hegemonic structure built on the subordination of indigenous communities and women could not remain intact in the face of subaltern agency. When a symbolic constitutional amendment was passed in 2001, due to the San Andres talks, to avoid the inevitable criticisms from the EZLN president Vicente Fox went as far as to avoid mentioning the Zapatistas entirely in his speech concerning the passing of the act.  This was largely done to avoid legitimising the EZLN – by not mentioning the Zapatistas the amendment could be presented as an act willingly performed by the state. However, as even a symbolic amendment was forced by a subaltern guerrilla group into existence, acknowledgement of said group would fully expose the weakness of traditional hegemony. If apparently ‘voiceless’ peoples were capable of changing structures the entire system could, in turn, be challenged.
Samuel Ruiz
In the first decade of the uprising a recurring theme from state, or pro-state, media were attempts to downplay the subaltern nature and rhetoric of the EZLN. President Carlos Salinas in 1994 stated that, ‘This is not an Indian uprising, but the action of a violent armed group’, whereas the conservative paper Diario El Dia accused bishop Samuel Ruiz of being the ‘Red Bishop’ who was ‘fermenting rebellion’ in league with communists.  One explanation for this is a standard attempt to delegitimise the EZLN and shift causation away from the state – if the uprising can be blamed on a small group of far-left radicals then inequality in Chiapas can safely be ignored. By looking at the subaltern we see a new, indirect reason for blaming the uprising on a small group manipulated by the local bishop. Decades of disenfranchisement had forced indigenous communities and women from accepted socio-political hegemony, and with the overlooking of a tradition of resistance these subaltern communities were consequently seen as being silent. Hence, an apparently sudden uprising was seemingly unthinkable for those within the hegemonic sphere.

A recurring aspect of anti-Zapatista rhetoric in the 1990s was that the group was made up of, or being manipulated by, foreign and non-indigenous agents. For example, in 1994 labour leader Fidel Velázquez blamed ‘Peruvians, Nicaraguans, Guatemalans and Salvadorans’ and the social-democratic Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) for the uprising.  As late as 1998 this narrative was being repeated. On February 13 journalist Lolita de Vega was chased away from the Autonomous Municipality of La Realidad, and she put the blame on foreigners ‘manipulating our Indians’.  The Zapatistas did encourage both national and international leftists to Chiapas to report on the Rising – the majority of non-Zapatista sources used in this post was part of this initial interest, such as Nettie Wild’s 1998 documentary, A Place Called Chiapas. This was used by pro-state media to paint the Zapatistas as a new ‘other’. Instead of indigenous Mexicans they were instead foreigners, or their willing dupes, working to undermine Mexico. Opponents of the EZLN used a xenophobic fear of the foreign other to try and discredit the movement – suppression of Mexico’s subalterns was unacceptable, but suppressing foreign infiltrators was. 

Furthermore, this is a continuation of the same rhetoric which blamed Bishop Ruiz for the uprising. Through a wilful misunderstanding of Chiapan history, and centuries of silencing of indigenous peoples and women, meant that Chiapas’ subalterns were seen as passive and unable to exert agency. Hence, we see the reaffirmation of the view of the passive subaltern – left-wing supporters of the Zapatistas were recast as their masters. De Vega’s choice of words was particularly telling – by stating ‘our Indians’ it implies that Chiapas’ indigenous population were part of Mexican society until the EZLN took them away. By casting the Zapatistas as rejecting Mexico there was a clear intent to further justify their subalternity; they held allegiances elsewhere. It is telling that the same year that de Vega claimed that foreigners were behind the EZLN, Nettie Wild was stopped by a state-ran ‘immigration checkpoint’ – the state itself was crafting the EZLN as being a foreign body.  By casting the Zapatistas as foreign through rhetoric and action it showed the state’s view on the subaltern – when attempts were made to break political hegemony they were seen as entirely rejecting Mexico.

The Other Campaign and After

Shortly after the decade anniversary the EZLN planned a new campaign: The Other Campaign. We have already discussed this campaign briefly, but it is worth discussing it here. To expand the liberatory rhetoric the EZLN sent Marcos and Ramona across Mexico to create alliances with a wide range of groups. These included LGBTQ+ rights advocates, student protesters, trade unions, feminists, indigenous activists outside of Chiapas, factory workers, peasants, prostitutes, and teachers. Marcos said the aim was 'to listen to the simple and humble people who struggle', but they also hoped for a countrywide campaign which could make the government rewrite the constitution. Unfortunately, since then there has only been the one campaign, and for over a decade the EZLN has largely focused on Chiapas. Albeit, they were setback by Ramona's tragic passing due to cancer. However, they have continued to work towards liberating local peoples, and this last decade have focused on challenging long-standing sexism in their ranks. In 2017 they broke their two-decade long opposition to electoral politics by sending Marichuy, a Nahua woman, to run for president. This exposure allowed them to expand into eleven new districts at the end of 2019, and, just a few days into 2020 they have already declared their intention to prevent mega-infrastructure projects being constructed in Chiapas.

The EZLN continues to inspire people across the world for their actions. We are sorry for the inconvenience, but this is revolution.

The sources I have used are as follows:
-People Without Faces, Directed by Elena Karykhalova, Oleg Myasoedov, and Vera Vorobyeva, (St Petersburg: Free Travel, 2016)
-A Place Called Chiapas, Directed by Nettie Wild, (New York, NY: Zeitgeist Films, 1998)
-Zapatistas: Crónica de una Rebelión, Directed by Victor Marina and Mario Viveros, (Mexico City: Canalseisdejulio, 2007)
-Castro, Y., ‘Interview: Regional Union of Craftswoman of Chiapas’, in Katzenberger, E., (ed.), First World, Ha Ha Ha! The Zapatista Challenge, (San Francisco, CA: City Lights Books, 1995), 111-118
-Edmonds-Poli, E., and Shirk, D., Contemporary Mexican Politics, Second Edition, (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2012)
-EZLN, ‘Demands at the Dialogue Table’, in Joseph, G., and Henderson, T., (eds.), The Mexico Reader: History, Culture, Politics, (Duke, NC: Duke University Press, 2009), 638-645
-Gramsci, A., ‘The Modern Prince’, in Hoare, Q., (ed.), Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, Trans. Smith, G., (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), 123-205
-Klein, H., ‘“We Learn as We Go” – Zapatista Women share their Experiences’, Toward Freedom, (2008), towardfreedom.org/archives/women/qwe-learn-as-we-goq-zapatista-women-share-their-experiences/, accessed 11 April 2019
-Mallett-Oultrim, R., ‘The Story behind the EZLN’s Decision to enter Mexico’s Presidential Race’, New Internationalist, (2016), newint.org/features/2016/10/25/ezln-enters-mexicos-presidential-race; accessed 8 April 2019
-Marcos, ‘The Zapatistas Hike up the Price of the Indigenous Mexican Blood’, in Vodovnik, Ž., (ed.), ¡Ya Basta! Ten Years of the Zapatista Uprising, (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2004), 83-86
-Marcos, ‘12 Women in the Twelfth Year’, in Vodovnik, Ž., (ed.), ¡Ya Basta! Ten Years of the Zapatista Uprising, (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2004), 226-233
-Olivera, M., ‘Subordination and Rebellion: Indigenous Peasant Women in Chiapas Ten Years after the Zapatistas Uprising’, Journal of Peasant Studies, (2005), 32:3-4, 608-628
-Petrich, B., ‘Voices from the Masks’, in Katzenberger, E., (ed.), First World, Ha Ha Ha! The Zapatista Challenge, (San Francisco, CA: City Lights Books, 1995), 41-54
-Poniatowska, E., ‘Women, Mexico, and Chiapas Revolutionary Women’s Law’, in Katzenberger, E., (ed.), First World, Ha Ha Ha! The Zapatista Challenge, (San Francisco, CA: City Lights Books, 1995), 99-108
-Russell, P., The Chiapas Rebellion, (Austin, TX: Mexico Resources Center, 1995)
-Stephen, L., Zapata Lives! Histories and Cultural Politics in Southern Mexico, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002)
-Weinberg, B., Homage to Chiapas: The New Indigenous Struggle in Mexico, (London: Verso, 2000)
-"El CNI esboza su estrategia contra el Tren Maya". Proceso. January 4, 2020

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